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Abstract 
The Phoenician past, historians have long argued, was the preserve of Lebanese 
nationalists who sought to trace the genealogy of their darling state into the distant 
past in order to articulate a distinctive identity for Lebanon reflecting their religious 
particularism and socio-economic interests. By contrast to this diachronic and often 
teleological approach, tracking the evolution of national consciousness, this article 
suggests a synchronic reading of the ways late Ottoman literati used the ancient past 
as an instrument of political debate and social reflection. The region’s public men, 
this article contends, found in the Phoenician past a soothing precedent for the 
massive migrations the Arabic-speaking Eastern Mediterranean witnessed from the 
1880s onwards – movements which prompted much fraught debate and discussion. 
Contemporary displacements, in such a reading, were but the product of ancient 
predispositions. Only in the wake of the First World War was the ancient past 
pressed into national service.   
Nationalism, the Scottish thinker Tom Nairn once remarked, is a Janus-faced 
thing. It looks at once backwards, into a past time of mythical glory, and 
forwards, to a bold future of glossy achievement, of “industrialisation, 
prosperity [and] equality.” As Nairn put it, “nationalism stands over the 
passage to modernity;” as successive peoples traipse under the arch of this 
“strait doorway,” they “look desperately back into the past, to gather strength 
wherever it can be found for the ordeal of ‘development’.”1 It is, in other 
words, a sort of retrospective progressivism, whose practitioners pick 
through the ruined vestiges of the past to find the materials with which to 
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build the future. The nation, then, resembles those Umayyad or Crusader 
fortresses in which one spies Roman plinths and capitals. Like Klee’s Angelus 
Novus, the nationalist wants nothing more than to “awaken the dead, and 
make whole what has been smashed” – or, rather, to conjure something 
distinctively new out of the mangled, misplaced pieces of the past.2  
Such a vision powerfully evokes the appeals and anxieties of nationalism, 
its uncertain promise of a better future, but also its factitiousness – its deep 
reliance upon the “selection, reformulation and, if necessary, invention of 
symbols and narratives.”3 However, it says nothing of the ways in which the 
past – with its rich supply of exemplars and correctives, justifications and 
explanations – can lend itself to a variety of political schemes and social 
theories not wedded to the realization of a national state. Furthermore, it 
concentrates upon varieties of political thought trained upon a horizon 
situated far away in a distant future, rather than those focused upon their 
immediate surroundings – conjectural, incidental forms of theory, born of 
the contemplation of context. More than simply a “fleeting moment in a … 
teleology connecting past and future,” the present often occupies a 
prominent place in the thoughts of political theorists and practitioners, who 
devise varying visions of community, population, and territory with an eye 
upon the exigencies of the moment.4 The past is not simply a rich cloth from 
which can be crafted glorious garb for a nation in becoming. Rather, it is also 
a resource to which political actors and thinkers might resort to resolve the 
pressing strains and stresses of the here and now.  
This article examines one such attempt to find some present use in the 
past: the growing exploitation of the ancient history of the Eastern 
Mediterranean seaboard by the public men of this region in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and their marked propensity to 
draw connections between the Phoenician inhabitants of this littoral and 
their own contemporaries. It will ask two deceptively simple questions: for 
what reasons did early twentieth-century literati resort to the Phoenician 
past? And in what ways did they cite, present, evoke, and invoke this past? 
Scholars have hitherto answered these questions with reference to the nation-
state. Ancient Phoenicia, they have argued, provided a powerful precedent 
for those Lebanese nationalists who wished to articulate a cohesive and 
distinctive national identity, which could both unite the citizens of a putative 
Lebanese state around a common myth of origin, and serve to differentiate 
them from their neighbors. More than just an unbroken connection to a 
glorious past, the assertion of ties of descent linking the inhabitants of this 
narrow strip of land hemming the middle sea to their Phoenician forebears 
provided Lebanese Christians – so this historiographical story goes – with the 
means to buttress their exceptionalist delusions. On the one hand, it offered a 
means of insulating themselves from the sweeping flood of Arab nationalism, 
an island of indigeneity amidst the tides of interlopers who had flowed into 
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the eastern Mediterranean in the centuries after the birth of Islam. On the 
other, it gave justification to their claims to a Lebanese Sonderweg – a special 
path to modernity born of a longstanding disposition for civilization. This, 
then, was genealogy as both programmatic pursuit and myth of progress.  
Thus, Asher Kaufman has argued that a historicist evocation of 
Phoenicia provided “Lebanese nationalists” with a means of justifying the 
“existence of Lebanon as a viable national community.” As Anthony Smith 
put it in a passage that serves Kaufman for an epigram: ‘there can be no 
identity without memory … no collective purpose without myth.’ But, aware 
though Kaufman is of the careful craft nationalist narratives demand, he 
cannot help but shape his own tale into a teleological arc. He is careful, it is 
true, to acknowledge that the marked “preoccupation” of early twentieth-
century literati “with the Phoenician past” was not initially born of a desire to 
craft a particularistic discourse to mark off the Christian denizens of Mount 
Lebanon and Beirut from their Muslim neighbors. Nevertheless, his 
undertaking remains driven, to the end, by his enduring wish to understand 
how this fascination with Phoenicia hardened into the exclusionary 
expressions he heard on the lips of the Phalangist fighters he encountered as 
an Israeli soldier serving in Lebanon in the early 1980s. His is a tale that 
travels full circle: beginning with an account of his own encounters with 
Christian militiamen, it ends with an account of the writings of Sa‘id ‘Aql and 
Etienne Saqr, the ideologues who provided these hardened figures with their 
fighting words.5    
Michelle Hartman and Alessandro Olsaretti have been more severe still 
in their assessment of the ways in which a single figure – the dilettantish if 
influential Lebanese banker and author Michel Chiha – put the Phoenician 
past to work. In their view, Chiha did not just seek to buttress Lebanon’s 
“Christian particularism” through his vision of a constitution founded upon 
confessional representation. More than this, he engaged in a “hegemonic 
project,” which would protect the interests of his own class through fostering 
broad ideological consent among the “subordinate groups” upon which it 
relied; manipulating a “set of symbols and ideas current in his day,” he 
remolded them to “fashion a Lebanese identity matching the political and 
economic program” of the “financial-mercantile bourgeoisie.” For Chiha, the 
natural features of their native land had left the modern Lebanese with few 
options but commerce, just as they had forced their Phoenician ancestors to 
become restlessly peripatetic traders. Geography, not ethnic essence, 
underlay the continuing mercantile inclinations of the inhabitants of this 
little corner of the earth. Lebanon could not help but be a “merchant 
republic” – and one whose economy should be shaped to fit the needs of its 
entrepreneurial elite, of whom Chiha was such a prominent member. In 
Hartman and Olsaretti’s terse words, “the self-image of one class is proposed” 
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in Chiha’s writings “as the image of the entire nation and an economic and 
political blueprint” presented as “accomplished fact.”6  
Now, it would be wrongheaded to suggest that such interpretations are 
entirely wide of the mark. There is no denying that the Phoenician past was 
pressed into service by ideologues eager to buttress their exclusionary visions 
of Lebanon as a Christian homeland, and to promote a particular economic 
path for the country. Indeed, there was nothing unusual about such practices: 
while Egyptian nationalists sought, until the 1930s, to root their claims in the 
rich loam of the Pharaonic past, their Iraqi counterparts of the interwar years 
wrote evocatively of ancient Nineveh and Babylon.7 However, their authors’ 
underlying preoccupations lead these accounts astray: written in the long 
hangover of the Lebanese civil war, they seek to edify, laud, and castigate as 
much as to explain; taking past actors to task for their nationalist delusions 
and capitalist mystifications, they cannot help but treat their words and 
thoughts as troubling portents, whose “ostensible failure” to paper over the 
cracks in Lebanese society paved the way for the conflict to come, or as 
potential salves providing a “legitimate” underpinning for a new “national 
consciousness.”8 Even as they seek to find the causes for the emergence of the 
discourses they anatomize, they cannot entirely keep their consequences out 
of mind. These are proleptic histories, running ahead of themselves in their 
eagerness to make the past account for the present.  
This article takes a rather different tack. Synchronic rather than 
diachronic in its approach, it suggests that we are best served by situating the 
various ways in which early twentieth-century public men used the tropes 
and tales of the ancient past against the backdrop of the fraught political 
debates and disputes in which they engaged. Rather than folding their 
accounts of antiquity into a teleological narrative of evolving national 
identity, or regarding them as a direct reflection of their socio-economic 
status, we should attempt to grasp what they sought to achieve in calling 
upon such antecedents, mapping the rhetorical territory they strove to stake 
out, and reconstructing the claims they made.9 Invocations of the Phoenician 
past served several overlapping purposes in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. But none, this article argues, was more important than 
providing some soothing explanation for the “successive displacements … 
and journeys” upon which they, and their compatriots embarked. 
Confronted from the 1880s onwards with the departure of migrants in their 
hundreds of thousands, the literati of the Arabic-speaking Eastern 
Mediterranean searched for the causes of this seemingly sudden eruption of 
movement, and sought to devise “structures of feeling” capacious enough to 
accommodate the unsettling facts of large-scale movement.10 Many, to be 
sure, found answers in contemporary conditions, blaming this exodus upon 
present-day rulers who, in their arbitrariness, cruelty, and ineptitude, 
curtailed liberties and sapped livelihoods, driving men and women away 
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from their native lands. But, even as they did so, some also turned towards a 
truncated version of the Phoenician past, which offered not just a historicist 
explanation for this seemingly unfathomable phenomenon, but proof of the 
potential for progress of the region’s contemporary inhabitants.  
To be sure, the Phoenician past did figure in wider accounts of the 
history and origins of the “Lebanese” or “Syrians.” Whether written to 
support the claims to whiteness of Eastern Mediterranean migrants living in 
the racially splintered United States of the early twentieth century,11 or to 
educate their Ottoman readers in the ways of modernity,12 these texts sought 
to instill in their audiences a sense of the grandeur and significance of past 
civilizations, the better to prepare them for present progress. But it is 
interesting that the Phoenicians were often minor figures in such narratives, 
only one of the many strands their authors drew upon to make their claims. 
It is only when they came to the problematic matter of migration that the 
literati and public men of the Arabic-speaking Eastern Mediterranean 
assigned particular importance to these ancient figures. In the years before 
1914, the Phoenician past lent itself not so much to the fixed certainties of 
nationalist ideology as to a kind of “travelling theory” – a series of attempts to 
take stock of migration, and conceive of society as a mobile construct, set 
upon foundations that were no less stable for having shifted about. Though 
this past was used to buttress claims to national self-determination in the 
years after World War One, older associations with diaspora did not 
altogether disappear. Rather, they were folded into seemingly conventional 
encomia to the nation and its glories, lending them a disconcerting 
ambivalence towards displacement, which was at once embraced as a sign of 
progress, and castigated as a dangerous escape from the tender clasp of the 
territorial state. In the following pages, I will put these uses of the Phoenician 
past in their place. Situating them amidst the often anxious ruminations of a 
host of authors overcome by modernity and the movements it brought in its 
wake,13 I will examine the ways the latter sought to use the past to make sense 
of the present. The cast of characters I will consider includes figures as varied 
as the Maronite priest Yusuf al-‘Amshiti and the liberal lawyer and Ottoman 
official Bulus Nujaym, in Mount Lebanon; the erstwhile functionary and 
socialist journalist Khayrallah Khayrallah, in Paris; the Lebanese patriot and 
political entrepreneur Yusuf al-Sawda, in Cairo; the historian Philip Hitti, in 
New York; the religious scholar, educator, and political reformer Shaykh 
Ahmad Tabbarah and the quixotic entrepreneur, poet, and dandy Charles 
Corm, in Beirut.  
The very dispersion of this cast of writers is significant. Political and 
intellectual historians of the Middle East have long worked within the 
confines of a neat “methodological nationalism,” producing studies framed 
by the borders of the states that came into being through the region in the 
years after the First World War.14 Only recently have scholars ventured 
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further afield, to consider the thoughts, sentiments, and actions of ordinary 
migrants, publishers, writers, and political entrepreneurs who settled 
throughout the mahjar – the lands of migration.15 Revealing the far-reaching 
lines of communication that wound their way from one node of migrant life 
to another, they have begun to reconstruct the conversations and debates that 
unfolded through this expansive political space. In doing so, they suggest that 
we might be better served by viewing the intellectual history of the Middle 
East not so much as a series of tableaux vivants set upon the stage of 
particular territories, but as a moving affair. Seen through the prism of 
movement, figures like Philip Hitti who left the region seem as much a part 
of its history as those who stayed put, like Ahmad al-Tabbarah or Charles 
Corm.  
But this article goes further than many recent works that have sought to 
integrate the lands of migration into the history of the Middle East. For while 
their authors have adopted a broader spatial purview than many of their 
predecessors, most have remained focused upon nationalism, whose various 
permutations and strands continue to exert a magnetic pull on scholars, just 
as they once did on historical actors. By contrast, I seek in these pages to 
revise our understanding of the intellectual history of the Eastern 
Mediterranean in the late nineteenth and twentieth century, moving away 
from teleological narratives centered upon the emergence and consolidation 
of various forms of nationalist thought, to consider the range of social, 
economic, and political concerns that animated authors of the period. More 
than simply a feature of the social history of these decades, I suggest, 
migration came to be a subject of anxious and earnest intellectual 
contemplation, working its way into the writings of contemporaries 
concerned with underlining their own capacity for progress and finding their 
place in the modern world.   
 
TALES OF PROGRESS –  OR,  THE RELATIVE 
INSIGNIFICANCE OF THE PHOENICIAN PAST 
One might assume that the Phoenicians offered tempting material to 
those who sought to assert the historical importance of Syria, and the 
capacity for progress of its denizens. These, after all, became familiar claims 
in the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, rehearsed 
by a succession of men of letters who considered themselves contributors to 
the nahda, or linguistic and cultural revival, of their native land. However, 
the Phoenicians occupied no special place within this historicist scheme. This 
is evident from a work like Yuhanna Abkarius’ 1877 Kitab qutf al-zuhur fi 
tarikh al-duhur, or history of the ages. As its author explained, this was 
designed to provide a “short account of the history of man, to give 
schoolchildren and the general masses” – al-‘amma, a term which had 
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hitherto designated the populace, but which was now increasingly used to 
evoke the public – a sense of “what had happened in earlier days, and of 
events that deserve recollection.” For “the art of history and the science of 
geography,” he hoped, could serve as a “means” of advancement, which 
would help “the Syrian land” – qutr al-sham – to “move forward year after 
year, growing in progress and order.” Organized into five sections of varying 
length and comprehensiveness, each recounting the history of one continent, 
this was effectively a universal history that sought to establish implicit 
comparisons between the various civilizations that had left their mark on 
world history. Though it gave pride of place to Europe, to which it accorded 
almost four hundred of its seven hundred-odd pages, the work began with a 
detailed account of the history of the cultures of Asia, organized into chapters 
on the Assyrians; the Hebrews; the “Madeans and Persians;” the “kingdom of 
China;” the Arabs; the “history of Syria,” which focused on the Seleucids, and 
“queen Zaynab, known to the Greeks and Romans as Zenobia,” and a short 
“account of Lebanon;” the Phoenicians; the Crusades; Asia Minor; India; and 
“the other states of Asia, like the Tatars, Japan, and Armenia.”16  
What is striking here is the way in which Abkarius hived off Phoenicia 
from both Lebanon and Syria, and from its ancient counterparts like Assyria. 
Far from being granted primacy, it was only given the ninth chapter, 
squeezed in anachronistically between accounts of Hellenistic and late 
Roman Syria, and of the Crusades and the Latin Kingdom. Moreover, 
Abkarius aimed not at glorification but at scrupulous objectivity. He 
acknowledged that “they had invented the art of shipbuilding and been the 
first to travel the seas, and the world’s sea trade had been in their hands.” 
Moreover, “their kings had sent multitudes to faraway places, which they 
settled and built up, so that the traces of their industry spread, and the reach 
of their language and learning extended in all directions.” Thus, it was 
“generally agreed that they had given the Romans and Greeks the letters of 
the alphabet and their earliest learning.”17 But, by the same dint, he sought to 
detail the “beastly, barbarous” nature of the religious beliefs and habits of a 
people who venerated idols,” making them sacrificial offerings of small 
children. Phoenicia, in such an account, figured neither as a precedent to be 
appreciated by Abkarius’ contemporaries, nor as an analogy upon which they 
might draw to buttress their own claims to civilization. Rather, it was but one 
of a number of exemplars, a state whose “rise and fall” stood as a cautionary 
tale from which they might learn how to better move forward in the ways of 
progress. We should be wary, then, of assuming that Phoenicia came to 
occupy an exceptional place in the historical accounts and civilizational 
schemes of men of letters like Abkarius. Likewise, we should not presume 
that it underpinned the racial claims of Eastern Mediterranean migrants to 
North America, eager to find a comfortable berth within the fraught racial 
hierarchies of their new abode.  
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Asher Kaufman has argued that Eastern Mediterranean migrants to 
North America came to stress their Phoenician antecedents “in an attempt to 
define their identity in a society that, on the one hand, despised them as 
Arabs or Turks and, on the other, forced all immigrants to be labeled 
according to nationality and race.” Such a strategy served a double purpose, 
allowing them both to express their “support for the existence of Greater 
Lebanon as a non-Arab state,” and to assert their place on the “American 
social ladder,” taking up a rung “higher than the Arabs or the Turks and 
equal to the Caucasian majority.”18 Kaufman is not wrong to point to the 
attempts of migrants from the Arabic-speaking Eastern Mediterranean to 
present themselves as “Syrians” or “Lebanese,” and to claim whiteness. 
Ottoman migrants in the years before 1914 “litigated their racial status” in a 
succession of naturalization hearings across the United States, in which they 
asserted their right to American citizenship by arguing that they were 
‘members of the white race.’ As Sarah Gualtieri has noted, these claims to 
whiteness did not rest so much upon phenotypic assessments as upon a 
complex calculus of culture, religion, geography, and civilization.19 While 
these attempts to secure citizenship were not always successful, “Syrian” 
claimants and journalists, lawyers, judges, and federal officials all came to 
accept the whiteness of Eastern Mediterranean migrants. For the most part 
Christian, these men and women hailed from ‘Western Asia.’ And, most 
importantly, they were Semites – and, as such, members of the Caucasian ‘or 
… white race,’ as the Eastern Mediterranean man of letters Jurji Zaydan 
explained in his work of racial typology, Tabaqat al-umam. The Phoenicians 
were, to be sure, included amongst the many antecedents cited to support 
such a claim. Thus, the physician H.A. Elkourie, the president of the Syrian 
Young Men’s Association of Birmingham, Alabama, insisted that the ‘Semitic 
was the original civilizer, developer and intermediator [sic] of culture and 
learning,’ from the Phoenicians to Jesus Christ. Crucially, though, Elkourie 
placed the emphasis far more upon the latter, and the common moral and 
religious heritage Syrians and Americans held in common, than upon the 
glories of pre-Christian civilization.20  
The same was true of Philip Hitti. In the opening sentence of his 1924 
work The Syrians in America, Hitti adamantly insisted: “the Syrians are 
neither Turks, as the United States census would take them, nor Arabs as 
some of them would take themselves to be.” “Nor,” he added, were they 
“Assyrians;” the latter, “domiciled in certain areas of Mesopotamia, 
Kurdistan, and Northwestern Persia … should not be confused with the 
modern inhabitants of Syria, the Holy Land, on the Eastern shore of the 
Mediterranean Sea.” Once again, faith and geography were put forward as 
distinctive features, marking Eastern Mediterranean migrants off from the 
rather more suspect peoples for whom they were sometimes mistaken. But 
while the Phoenicians were mentioned in Hitti’s account of the origins of the 
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“Syrians,” he did not accord them primary importance as a single source of 
ancestry.  Rather, they were cited as just one of a succession of peoples who 
had contributed to the hybrid nature of the “Syrians,” whose blended blood 
was the result of many centuries of settlement, conquest, and cultural 
encounter. As Hitti put it, “the modern Syrians are the remnant of the 
ancient Phoenician-Canaanite tribes who entered Syria about 2500 B.C., the 
Aramean Israelite hordes who arrived about 1500 B.C., and the Arabs who 
have drifted, and still drift, from the desert and gradually pass from a 
nomadic to an agricultural state.” To this “Semitic stock,” he continued, 
should be added the contributions of “the Greek settlers and colonists of the 
Seleucidae period,” “Frankish and other European Crusaders,” and “Kurdish 
and Persian invaders and immigrants.” The Syrians, then, had no single 
origin. Rather, they were a “highly mixed race.”21 Admixture, not purity, was 
paramount to this account.  
Hitti repeated much the same claims in a series of lectures he gave to the 
jam‘iyya tahdhibiyya fi niuyurk, or New York Educational Society, in late 
1925 and early 1926. Speaking against the fraught background of the great 
Syrian revolt, he proclaimed that his “was not simply a historical inquiry, but 
a live social inquiry, of great pertinence to some of the most important 
problems our people and our old country are presently facing.” For Hitti 
sought to confront Arabism, “founded upon the principle that the Arabic-
speaking peoples, including the Syrians, are Arabic in blood and origin.” The 
“modern Syrian,” he insisted, while of “Semitic blood,” was born of the 
“mixture of numerous peoples, each of differing stock, and speaking 
distinctive languages.” These included, he now declared, “the Assyrians, the 
Babylonians, the Chaldeans, the Hebrews, the Phoenicians, the Aramaic and 
the Arabs.” Once again, the Phoenicians were mentioned as just one of the 
many peoples that had met, fought, and intermarried on Syrian soil, 
eventually coming to forge the Syrian, that distinctive racial alloy. Nor did 
Hitti see it fit to mention the Phoenicians in the account of the ways in which 
“the West benefited from the East” that followed this many-branched racial 
genealogy. Rather, he focused upon the Crusades, and the intellectual and 
cultural debt the Frankish knights and colonists of the Latin kingdoms had 
accrued to their autochthonous inhabitants, and the Umayyad period, when 
Syria had been at the “peak of its glory.”22  
Only in attempting to account for the peripatetic ways of his 
contemporaries did Hitti come to rely upon the Phoenician past. In a 
pamphlet published in 1919, and based upon a series of articles that had first 
appeared in the Cairo-based scientific monthly al-Muqtataf, he set out to 
craft a travelled history for his fellow Eastern Mediterranean migrants to the 
United States. In these pages, Hitti did not just draw a direct connection 
between the “ancient Syrian – the Phoenician – whose travels in the world of 
colonization and migration were written in water of gold upon the pages of 
82 Andrew Arsan	  
the sea,” and the “modern Syrian,” the “descendent” of these “lords of the 
seas,” who had “travelled far and wide” through the earth. More than this, he 
attempted to recover those intervening passages lost to history, recounting 
the movements of his forebears in late antiquity and the Middle Ages; these 
pages, he argued, “do not separate, but join together, the succession of 
migrations that began with the Phoenicians and finished with the migrants of 
today.” Leading his readers through the Seleucid, Roman, Venetian, and 
modern ages, he sought to show the signal role Syrian colonists – 
musta‘mirun – and migrants – muhajirun – had played in the progress of 
world history. Whether as “soldier[s], merchant[s], priest[s]” or even 
“slave[s],” Hitti’s forebears had “laid the path of … civilization” for the 
“Roman people;” instilling in the latter “a new political, philosophical, 
scholarly, literary, artistic, and religious spirit,” Syrians had left a deep 
“influence” upon the Roman culture that Europeans and North Americans 
claimed as their intellectual heritage.23  
Furthermore, the Phoenicians were the first in a long line of “colonists” 
who had forged the ways of the west. Followed in antiquity by the 
“Carthaginians, the Greeks, and the Romans”; in the Middle Ages by Syrians 
and “Italians from Florence, Genoa, and Venice;” and in modern times by 
“Portugal, then Spain, Holland, France, England” – and perhaps, in the 
“future,” by “American, then Japanese and Chinese” “traders and colonists” – 
they had been pioneers of the overseas expansion which still stood, in the 
second decade of the twentieth century, as one of the ultimate marks of 
political strength and civilizational progress. However, the colonies of the 
Syrians – ancient and modern – had distinguished themselves by their 
exclusively mercantile character. For Hitti, “the colonies of the Romans were 
the result of their victories, and those of the Greeks that of the failure of 
political factions, which were then forced to leave the country, and the 
colonies of Portugal and Spain in America, Holland in southern Africa, and 
England in Australia, were for the most part agricultural and sometimes 
military.” But “Syrian settlements,” alone, were “in the main commercial.” 
Some had been, in ancient times, the result of “demographic overcrowding” 
and Syria’s “geographic position,” and others, more recently, of “political and 
religious decline” and “economic pressure.” Some were the work of the state, 
others of “independent individuals” who belonged to the “people.” But those 
Syrian colonies that had proved most enduring were those that had “held on 
to their [commercial] identity.” “On the whole,” then, “the history of Syrian 
migration was … rich in benefits,” showing as it did the “energy and 
intelligence of the Syrians, their readiness for progress, and their desire for 
success.”24 This, it is clear, was a narrative designed to give encouragement to 
Hitti’s fellow migrants to the United States – instilling in them a sense of the 
longstanding historical disposition of their forebears for migration and 
mercantile activity. It attempted not so much to provide a blueprint for a 
Citizens of the World…Who Stopped On Every Shore 83 
body politic framed within the fixed borders of the territorial state, as to 
make sense of the churning waves of movement in which Hitti and his 
contemporaries were engulfed. 
 
LOSSES AND GAINS:  MIGRATIONS PAST AND PRESENT IN 
THE BALANCE 
And churning waves they were. Contemporaries like Ahmad Tabbarah 
and the Zionist emissary Arthur Ruppin estimated that between 500,000 and 
550,000-odd migrants left Ottoman “Syria” between the 1880s and the First 
World War – a figure with which latter-day scholars like Kemal Karpat have 
largely concurred.25 Most headed for the United States, Argentina, and Brazil 
or for other New World destinations like Cuba, Haiti, Mexico, or Ecuador, 
though some also found their way to colonial French and British West Africa, 
South Africa, Australia, and the Philippines. These men and women hailed 
from across Syria – a geographical expression that encompassed, for 
Tabbarah, the Ottoman provinces of Beirut, Damascus, and Aleppo, and the 
governorates of Jerusalem and Mount Lebanon.26 However, there can be no 
doubt that the last of these administrative entities, an autonomous enclave 
created in the wake of the sectarian strife which tore through its escarpments 
in 1860, experienced exceptionally high rates of migration. 27  Around a 
quarter of Mount Lebanon’s 400,000 or so inhabitants had left its exiguous 
territories by 1915, according to Ottoman functionaries. 28  The historian 
Akram Khater has gone further still, estimating that more than a third of 
Mount Lebanon’s inhabitants lived beyond the confines of the Ottoman 
empire on the eve of the First World War. 29  In certain localities, the 
proportion of migrants was even higher: migrants represented some 42% of 
the resident population of Zahleh and its immediate environs.30 Such rates of 
departure can surely account, in large measure, for the acute anxiety 
migration occasioned in the literati of Mount Lebanon and the neighboring 
provinces in the years before the First World War. 
But such movements could also bring undeniable benefits. Albert 
Naqqash, the Ottoman public works inspector of Mount Lebanon, thus 
estimated in the run-up to the First World War that the 90,000 francs 
migrants remitted each year amounted to some 41% of the autonomous 
governorate’s revenues. Much the same pattern was replicated at the local 
level: the mayor of the seaside town of Batrun, for instance, told a visiting 
Ruppin that the 200,000 francs its denizens received annually from their 
relatives “in America” accounted for 43% of its “income”. This money was 
particularly welcome in the years before the First World War, helping to 
make up for the marked decline in European demand for the silk on which 
the mountain’s economy had come to depend. But Mount Lebanon was not 
alone in reaping such vicarious benefits; around 30 million francs in 
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remittances entered Syria each year, much of it through the banks and 
clearing-houses of Beirut, whose economy increasingly relied on the profits 
of human movement.31  
It is no surprise, then, that contemporaries should have viewed migration 
as both a demographic hemorrhage, draining the land of its native children, 
and as a potential boon, which might restore some strength to a region 
suffering, in their eyes, the consequences of straitened economic 
circumstances and the depredations of misrule. Some could move between 
these seemingly contradictory positions as circumstances dictated. This was 
the case of Bulus Nujaym, whose doctoral dissertation, La Question du Liban: 
étude d’histoire diplomatique et de droit international, a long and learned 
disquisition on the geography, history, and shifting legal and administrative 
status of the Lebanese mountain, appeared in early 1908. “Emigration,” noted 
Nujaym, had become a “regular and permanent sociological phenomenon in 
Lebanon” in the course of the nineteenth century. For, “despite the intelligent 
activity of the Lebanese to develop constantly their small country’s economic 
resources, it could no longer feed its population”. The continuing departure 
of so many of the mountain’s native sons and daughters was, for Nujaym, 
profoundly “worrying” on two grounds. On the one hand, that so many 
should have been “obliged” to leave was a stark reminder of Lebanon’s deep-
seated economic and social ills. On the other, these departures could only 
lead to further deterioration in its living conditions, as the mountain lost 
ever-growing numbers of its best and brightest for good. There had been a 
time when “emigrants” had been able to “buy a small plot of land with the 
capital they had amassed abroad” “upon returning to the homeland they love 
so intensely”. Through their economic activities, the “returnees” – a word 
that fails to capture the striking, eerie connotations of the French term 
Nujaym used, les revenants, an expression which conjured up images of these 
men and women as spirits, who left behind the social death of migration to 
return to the world of those living in the homeland – had once “made the 
Mountain participate in the general movement of civilization and its 
progresses” and “widened the intellectual horizons of their compatriots”. 
That time, though, was now passed. “[U]nfortunately”, migrants could now 
leave “only with the hope of returning one day to die in the mountain; to 
come back to work, to contribute to the greatness and prosperity of their 
patria, they are now almost prohibited from doing”. The transition was 
dramatic: where migrants had once brought life to Mount Lebanon, serving 
as agents of development whose movements had helped to pull the region 
into the modern world, they now went there only to die, their demise a stark 
reminder of the dashed hopes of those who stayed behind.32  
However, this elegiac narrative was more than just a conventional 
meditation upon the enduring losses of migration, that endless flow slowly 
draining away the vital forces of the social body. Rather, it served to underpin 
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the fiercely anti-clerical politics of Nujaym, a self-declared member of the 
ahrar or “free men” of Mount Lebanon.33 The name of this faction denoted 
its members’ self-conscious liberalism and attachment to “liberty, progress, 
and democracy” – values that, Nujaym argued, were deeply rooted in the 
native institutions of Mount Lebanon, if threatened by the base appetites of 
the traditional notability and the venality and petty despotism of Ottoman 
administration. But it also hinted at their sense of themselves as libre-
penseurs, free thinkers hostile to the Maronite church and its deep 
involvement in the political and economic life of the province. The “Lebanese 
congregations,” Nujaym alleged, had “since their origins, one principal goal, 
which they have pursued tirelessly: to increase their material power”. In 
seeking to realize this ambition, they had accumulated “immense domains”, 
while remaining blind to the nefarious effects of such a policy upon their 
flocks, whose members, deprived of their ability to live off their native land, 
had been left with no other option but flight. In turn, Nujaym’s call for an 
end to the clerical privileges which had allowed the congregations to rob 
Lebanon of a third of its best lands formed but one plank of a wider raft of 
“agrarian and economic reforms”, ranging from the opening of a seaport at 
Juniyyeh to the creation of commercial tribunals for the province. These were 
designed to improve the living conditions of Mount Lebanon’s inhabitants – 
and, in a neat cyclical move, to stem the tide of “emigration,” a “problem” on 
whose “resolution” hung the “future” not just of Lebanon, but of all Syria.34 
Nujaym told a rather different tale ten years later in the long “note on the 
history of Lebanon” he contributed to a volume of “scholarly and social 
studies” commissioned by Isma‘il Haqqi Bek, the wartime governor of Beirut 
and Mount Lebanon. This encyclopedic gazetteer, with its succession of 
articles on the industry and agriculture, geology and topography, archaeology 
and sociology of Mount Lebanon written by a “committee of men of letters,” 
stood as a veritable monument of progress amidst the wreckage of the First 
World War, whose turmoil and destruction were coolly excluded from its 
calm, positivistic descriptions. Accordingly, Nujaym presented migration as a 
symptom of the advancements the reforming Ottoman state had brought to 
the “Syrian coast.” Amongst the “first Ottoman regions” to receive 
“telegraphic lines for the transmission of news not just to the centers of the 
state, but also to foreign lands,” this area had also benefited more recently 
from the laying of “telephone cables between the towns of the coast and 
Lebanon.” Beirut and Damascus, meanwhile, now “glowed” with the 
“majesty” of “electric and gas” belvederes whose “lights reached into every 
corner of the night.” The “result” of these changes was a “visible 
improvement in the condition of the Lebanese, who “awakened energetically” 
to the potential of the age, and “strove for the material and moral progress of 
their mountains.” Migration, Nujaym suggested, was but a natural 
progression from this remarkable domestic revival, born of the Eastern 
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Mediterranean’s engagement with Europe, whose “ships” visited “our ports 
every day, enriching our lands … and bringing considerable profits to our 
national coffers.” As the mountain was engulfed in this “general movement,” 
some of its inhabitants began to travel, “first towards Egypt, then to Europe, 
America, and Australia.” Having grown rich in the lands of migration, they 
“returned to their homeland, and spent their gains in improving” its 
economic potential. “Since that time” when the first migrants had returned, 
the mountain had come to be covered in “welcoming, solid buildings,” whose 
“structure” these figures worked to improve, covering their roofs in “red 
tiles.” The villages they hailed from had come to take on a “majestic 
appearance,” their “pretty buildings” surrounded by gardens of “trees and 
flowers.” Some migrants, Nujaym continued, had put themselves to 
“agriculture, planting trees and forests,” and digging channels to irrigate 
them, so that “parts of Lebanon that had once lain barren were now covered 
in greenery.” Others had taken an interest “in industry and crafts, 
establishing silk factories in various regions,” building upon the long 
engagement of the inhabitants of villages like Zuq and Bayt Shabab with 
handicraft.35  
In this narrative – written in the last, bitter, years of the First World War, 
which brought widespread devastation to the Eastern Mediterranean – 
Nujaym presented progress as a movement – a process founded quite literally 
upon the circulation of commodities and information, and upon the travels 
of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, first outwards in concentric circles 
extending through the world, and then back to their homeland, where their 
hard-won gains could be put to good use. In doing so, he appeared not just to 
echo the official imperial script of benevolent reform, but also to renege upon 
his bleak earlier account of migration, its causes, and consequences. All was 
not, however, as it seemed. On the one hand, even as he skillfully deployed 
Ottoman rhetoric, he undercut its tropes by pointing to the beneficial effects 
of foreign trade, at a time when the Sublime Porte had revoked the 
Capitulations and the seaports whose activities he lauded were blockaded by 
French and British warships, their docks emptied of life. On the other hand, 
his vision of Lebanon as a verdant Arcadia transformed by the deft touch of 
returning migrants was no disingenuous attempt to disavow his earlier 
stance. Rather, it reflected the deep-seated ambivalence of many Eastern 
Mediterranean literati towards migration – which they could view as at once 
a symptom of a social disintegration it only helped to aggravate, and as a 
boon, which brought prosperity and progress to the region.  
Indeed, some could move between these seemingly contradictory 
positions within the confines of a single text. This was the case of the 
Maronite priest Yusuf al-‘Amshiti, whose short meditation on “migration, its 
benefits and disadvantages” appeared in 1911 in al-Mashriq, the staunchly 
clerical journal of the Jesuit seminary of Beirut. It was increasingly necessary, 
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‘Amshiti argued, to consider “all sides” of the question – whether “moral” or 
“material,” beneficial or detrimental, for migration “had become one of the 
most significant questions preoccupying the majority of the Syrian people, 
and not least the Lebanese.” On the one hand, its corrosive effects upon 
society were plain to see. Perhaps most obvious was the “neglect of 
[agricultural] lands, which suffer from the paucity of labor, so that before too 
long they will yield only thorns and thistles, and our settlements will become 
havens for the retired and the aged.” But also of ill portent were the 
“detrimental effects” of migration upon the “offspring” of those who 
departed, caused by the “loss of fatherly tenderness and filial feelings, 
weakened by years of distance and separation.” Moreover, movement also 
had deleterious effects upon migrants themselves: taking on “work contrary 
to religion [and] morality,” and indulging in the “company of the lower 
classes,” they received an “education in the ways of evil,” and were exposed to 
“a variety of illnesses the Lebanese did not previously know.” It was therefore 
“no surprise” that the “Syrian’s standing” should have “declined,” and that 
the “American should have been led to look at him askance, till his 
condemnation grew stronger and he forbade him many of the rights he had 
once enjoyed.”36  
On the other hand, the benefits of migration were undeniable. Thus, 
“whoever had studied the condition of the new world and examined its cities 
and capitals, its urbanity and learning and inventions, the progress of its 
peoples, and the causes of its peace and tranquility,” and who had “compared 
our schools, our sciences and industries and comportment to those of the 
lands of migration … would realize that migration … is one of the most 
important means of attaining riches and success.” But its effects were not 
confined to those who had departed. Without migration, “most of the people 
of Lebanon would be without shelter,” and their “wearisome labors” could 
hardly provide for their “numerous” offspring, for there was “neither crafts, 
nor industry or [commercial] activity in Lebanon.” Migration had changed 
all that, effecting a veritable social revolution: “he who knew our past 
condition, and our present state, could hardly keep in check his wonder and 
bafflement at this rapid turn-around.” The “poor man, who had not a penny 
to his name, imitates the civilized countries and erects high buildings and fills 
his house with sumptuous furnishings he could not once have dreamed of.” 
Could it ever “have crossed his mind that he would buy his master’s lands 
and lend him money, were it not for migration?” But this social 
transformation had not just benefited the poorest of Lebanon’s inhabitants; 
the rich, too, had profited thanks to the “rise in the prices of properties and 
lands.” Moreover, migration had had beneficial effects upon the state of 
society and economy alike: not only had the “presence” of “currency” in 
greater quantity “lightened the burden of the moneylenders,” who had once 
been so rampant; what is more, “migrants had created a vital movement in 
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commerce and industry, which had put the builder and the craftsman, the 
blacksmith and the merchant, to work.” The intellectual effects of migration 
were perhaps more palpable still. Amongst its “most visible benefits” was its 
capacity to “transport” many from their spot “under the oak tree,” where they 
had languished in the care of the “village schoolmaster,” to “institutions of 
higher learning,” where they thrived under the stewardship of “famous 
professors … nourishing their minds with the finest of sciences” After all, 
migration had been a source of progress throughout the ages. How else had 
the first men, who “knew nothing of agriculture, save sowing seeds in the 
ground, and no other tools but the axe and the spade,” first “extended their 
knowledge”? And how could “our peasant have conceived of the telegraph, 
the products of steam power, the exchange of speech between two people, 
one in America and the other in Europe, and other inventions besides … had 
he not witnessed them with his own eyes, and examined their secrets?”37  
To be sure, migration presented moral dangers. But these could be reined 
in by “temperance, moderation, and reliance upon [certain] exemplary 
rules.” For instance, men should maintain their mastery over their women, 
and “neither should leave the other.” Should they have children, they should 
“take every care to place them in religious schools,” and to “instill in their 
hearts the spirit of faith and love for the homeland.” Those who “built 
dwellings in foreign lands should not allow greed … and covetousness to 
make them forget that they had, beyond the seas, an aged father who waited 
patiently … for their return, a mother who complained of their behavior, 
children whose eyes stung with harsh tears, and a little house amidst 
mulberry and oak trees.” And, finally, all should “remember incessantly the 
need that compelled them to travel to a far-off country, different in race, 
language and nationality, in food and drink and faith;” keeping in mind that 
they were the “sons of a patria that had protected its religion with its blood,” 
they should remain wary of “any tradition foreign to it.” All of these sermon-
like rhetorical questions and admonitions belied the profound disquiet 
migration provoked among Maronite clergymen, anxious that their flock 
might slip out of their grasp and fall into immoral ways in the lands of 
migration. Despite such worries, ‘Amshiti could not resist the conclusion 
that, so long as migration was kept properly in check, its benefits could not be 
dispensed with. For it was – as he put it in a striking turn of phrase – a 
movement from the “shadows of night into the light of day.”38 
Concern for migration, though, was by no means confined in these years 
to the denizens of Mount Lebanon and its Christian clergy, so intent upon 
keeping their congregations to the straight and narrow. “Migration from, and 
into, Syria” – a question that encompassed both the departure of so many 
men and women for the diaspora, and the disruptive arrival of Zionist settlers 
and refugees fleeing the Ottoman empire’s war-stricken European provinces 
– was deemed significant enough a social and political phenomenon to be 
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one of the four main topics tabled for discussion at the “First Arab congress,” 
a gathering of notables drawn, for the most part, from the reformist circles of 
Beirut, Cairo, Alexandria, and Paris which met in the city of light in mid-
June 1913. It is a sign of its importance that the other issues its delegates 
debated were the most significant political concerns of the day: “national life 
and resistance to occupation” – a constant source of anxiety in the wake of 
the Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1908, the Italian occupation of present-
day Libya in 1911, and the Balkan War of 1912-1913; the “rights of the Arabs 
in the Ottoman state;” and “the need for reform on the basis of 
decentralization,” which might counteract the overweening centralizing drive 
of the Committee of Union and Progress, and provide the Arab provinces 
with a cherished measure of autonomy.39  
Addressing the question of migration, Shaykh Ahmad Tabbarah 
regarded it as intimately tied up to broader debates on the shape and purpose 
of the state. As he put it: “migration is the result of constraints upon living 
conditions, and [these] are the products of arbitrariness and administrative 
wrongs.” Where ‘Amshiti had accounted for large-scale movement in 
essentially economic terms, Tabbarah regarded it as the ultimate 
consequence of political ineptitude and oppression. The country, with its 
“bursting springs and gentle winds and excellent soil,” had a great deal of 
potential, and had known prosperity under first the Romans, then the Arabs. 
What is more, its present-day inhabitants had shown an admirable “readiness 
for progress” and a “great appetite for … success in all marches of life.” No 
further evidence of this was needed than their ability to “reach, through their 
wits, the highest peaks” of professional success; in places such as Egypt, 
where Syrians like Khalil Pasha Hamada and Saba Pasha “held positions like 
the Europeans,” they stood “shoulder to shoulder” with citizens of the “most 
advanced nations.” But all this was no use without good rule. As Tabbarah 
noted laconically, “experience had proved” that “no vital questions” could be 
dealt with by any “nation” if “a political life” had first not been 
“established.”40  
It is in the context of these discussions of the causes, costs, and benefits of 
migration that we must situate evocations of the Phoenician past. ‘Amshiti 
and Tabbarah sought to make rather different points. The former attempted 
to maintain departing men and women within the fold of a Maronite 
Catholicism defined as much by an attachment to the native soil of Lebanon 
as by piety and moral constancy. Though he was by no means entirely 
suspicious of materialism, whose achievements he vaunted repeatedly, his 
paternalism was driven by a deep concern to preserve the bonds of family in 
the face of the crisis of patriarchy provoked by male migration, and to stave 
off the forces of unbelief and turpitude. It is no coincidence that he should 
have ended his piece with one, final, prohibition – against joining “secret 
societies, not least the Masons,” who preyed upon the “guilelessness” of the 
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Syrian – echoing the vitriolic campaigns of his Jesuit patrons against 
Freemasonry and its atheistic proponents.41 Tabbarah, meanwhile, saw in the 
outflow that sapped, year after year, the vital force of the body politic the 
clearest vindication of his calls for a “veritable political life,” founded upon 
“common participation in rule and … decentralization,” the principles for 
which he had campaigned as a member of the Beirut Reform Society 
throughout early 1913, and which he had come to Paris to defend.42  
Both, however, made use of the Phoenician past, evoking the peripatetic 
tendencies and mercantile abilities of these illustrious forebears to buttress 
their arguments. Intent upon demonstrating the “necessity” of migration, 
‘Amshiti asked whether “anyone could deny the state of barbarity in which 
the Greek lands lay until the Phoenicians brought their gifts unto them” – not 
least that most visible mark of civilization, writing, which Cadmus had 
introduced, bringing with him the alphabet. The influence of the 
Phoenicians, then, was still plain to see in the “names of [Greece’s] peoples, 
in its cities, religions, and the principles of its culture.” Indeed, the 
Phoenicians, who had “crossed the seas,” laying “down the routes” of 
navigation, had “civilized all the states and peoples to which they migrated in 
Asia, Africa, Europe and even in America.” There was, to be sure, some 
measure of patriotic pride in ‘Amshiti’s selection of this particular example. 
Nevertheless, it served not so much to provide a basis for present-day 
identity, as to bolster his contention that “whoever should explore the 
condition of … peoples … will realize at first glance a propensity, whether 
voluntary or coerced, for migration.” Thus, he continued in a comparative 
vein: “were we to examine all the kingdoms” that had left their mark upon 
world history, and the causes of their rise and fall, “we should find the cause 
for migration from them and towards them.”43 The entire run of human 
history, the life and death of states and civilizations, ‘Amshiti intimated, hung 
upon the movement of peoples. This was no boastful claim to an exceptional 
destiny, designed to mark off one people from its neighbors and peers. Quite 
the contrary – ‘Amshiti sought to soothe and alleviate the anxieties of his 
contemporaries, by reminding them that their compatriots’ displacements 
had nothing unusual about them, but fitted into the general pattern of 
human behavior.  
Tabbarah, for his part, drew a clearer connection between past and 
present. To do so, he quoted from La Syrie d’aujourd’hui, the travel account 
published in 1884 by the French medical doctor, botanist, zoologist, and 
archaeologist Louis Lortet, who had noted that the ‘commercial nature’ of 
‘the Syrian’ – that ‘energetic Arab trader who knows no weariness or strain’ – 
‘reminds us that he descends from the Phoenicians, whose trading fleets 
sailed to the furthest lands known in those days.’ Such words served several 
purposes. Of course, they provided the contemporary Syrian with a past of 
which he could be proud, neatly placing him in the lineage of distinguished 
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forebears both ancient and Arab, with their heritage of ‘strength and 
nobility.’44 This was in line with a more general tendency on Tabbarah’s part 
to make no distinction between Syria’s Islamic and pre-Islamic past, 
assembling instead a vision in which his native patria was at once a separate, 
clearly-defined, entity, with a history all its own; an integral part of a broader 
Arab whole; and a significant contributor to the progress of world history, 
which had long served as a “link between the peoples of Asia, Africa, and 
Europe.”45 But this was only part of it. On the one hand, Lortet’s words 
provided Tabbarah with an alternative, and perhaps less disquieting, 
explanation for his contemporaries’ wanderlust: ‘travel’ was quite simply in 
their ‘nature,’ an inherited feature passed down from generation to 
generation. On the other, it underscored his central point. For, Lortet 
continued, ‘should [the Syrian] only be allowed a veritable political life, he 
would attain a remarkable condition, and play an important role in the 
history of the world.’ That a Frenchman should have made the point only 
lent further credence to Tabbarah’s insistence upon his compatriots’ 
readiness for progress, demonstrating that it was no vain delusion but an 
impression shared by Europeans. And, most importantly, it underscored his 
central contention: were the Ottoman state to acquiesce in the “reform” 
required to furnish Syria with an “honourable political life,” its inhabitants 
would rapidly make “advances to confound understanding.”46 Once again, 
the Phoenician past was not treated as a point of origin, a justification for the 
existence of latter-day polities and a source of solidarity for their denizens, 
but rather as a rhetorical tool, used to support a wider social and political 
inquiry and argument.  
The Phoenician past provided figures like ‘Amshiti and Tabbarah with 
ready explanation for the discombobulating movements of their 
contemporaries. But it could also furnish the material to craft more utopian 
visions of the political future, even as it continued to be used to make sense of 
the migrations of the present. This is evident from the Paris writings of the 
socialist and Lebanese patriot Khayrallah Khayrallah, who had been forced to 
flee Mount Lebanon and his life as an Ottoman functionary after organizing a 
rally in celebration of the 1st of May on the beach at Dbayyeh. In a long essay 
on the social and intellectual state of Syria published in 1912 in the French 
Orientalist Revue du monde musulman, Khayrallah recounted the history of 
his homeland in diasporic form as a tale of successive departures and returns, 
like those of the scholars employed in the Maronite College of Rome and the 
Bibliothèque du Roy, established by Louis XIV. Brokers who had brought 
Oriental learning to the courts of Europe and transferred European 
knowledge to their own land, these figures perhaps reminded Khayrallah of 
his own fate – a man who expounded upon the past and present of his native 
land to a European audience even as he sought to explain the concepts of 
capitalism and class to an Eastern Mediterranean audience.47  
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Khayrallah’s evocation of the Phoenicians was perhaps the culmination 
of this vision of physical movement, untrammelled intellectual exchange and 
cross-cultural understanding. For the legacy of these forebears’ voyages, he 
suggested, lived on in the “Phoenician traditions” of travel the contemporary 
Syrian carried in his bosom. The latter’s inherited capacity to “venture 
without fear” onto “Western beaches” only enhanced his exposure, growing 
“stronger day by day,” to the “wonders of Western civilization.” This 
“contact,” in turn, was increasingly giving rise “to new ideas and conceptions, 
leading to efforts and aspirations which have begun to suggest the contours 
of a future Syria” born of intellectual hybridization between East and West. 
Furthermore, the past offered up not just precedents, but also exemplars. 
While Palestine had remained “theocratic and hierarchical,” and its children 
“saw in each foreigner an enemy”, the Phoenician – the son of a “democratic, 
republican” land – was a “citizen of the world” who “mixed with every 
people, and stopped off on every shore, carrying everywhere, along with the 
products of his industrial genius, the seeds of civilization and the great 
brotherhood of peoples.” This was a mixed message. At once exclusionary 
and expansive, it marked Palestine off from Syria even as it underscored the 
latter’s openness to the world. The Phoenician past, then, provided 
Khayrallah both with the confines of a territorially circumscribed political 
community and with the tools to craft a manifesto for a better future, 
founded upon the cosmopolitanism, democratic spirit, and civilizational 
comity to which his contemporaries should aspire. 48  But few, I have 
suggested, shared Khayrallah’s sense of the potential of displacement to mold 
new subjects, to craft new, more open selves. Rather, men like Tabbarah and 
‘Amshiti sought solace, and found explanation, in the ancient past. Theirs 
was a travelling theory of sorts, a form of social thought which attempted to 
track and make sense of movement, as much as it was an attempt to build a 
common identity from the ruins of the past.  
  
EMBATTLED USES:  CLAIM-MAKING AND PATRIOTISM IN 
THE POST-WAR YEARS  
But such evocations of the Phoenician past could themselves migrate into 
new discursive contexts, finding novel uses in the years after the First World 
War, when Eastern Mediterranean literati mobilized in numbers to press 
their varying demands for self-determination upon the international 
community. Thus, Khayrallah Khayrallah reprised his earlier engagement 
with the ancient past to buttress his claim that the contemporary “evolution 
of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon” was “deserving” of the “attention” of the 
“governments of the civilized world.” For not only had the “Arab element of 
the Ottoman empire spontaneously sided with the Allies,” suffering the 
“martyrdom” of “physical and moral torture, conscription, mass executions, 
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prison, famine, [and] epidemic illness” for its decision. More than this, “this 
land whose fate is currently in play is the most venerable of all, as it is the 
cradle of humanity, and civilized humankind cannot, without seeming 
ungrateful, fail to respect its origins.” For it was in “the Levant” that 
“humanity first became conscious of itself,” and that the “great philosophical 
and religious ideas that … constitute the universal patrimony were born.” 
“Darkness,” it was true, had since passed over these lands: “Babylon, 
Nineveh, and Palmyra are ruins, Byblos, Tyre, and Sidon small towns, 
Damascus and Baghdad pale reflections of the cities of the Caliphs.” But, he 
went on, “from the midst of … this decrepitude rises a new spirit, and this 
anxious soul comes to ask of the civilized world its right to life.” There was 
nothing untoward about such expectations, Khayrallah insisted. After all, 
“the modern era” had already “witnessed great resurrections: Athens has 
regained its place in the sun of freedom; Rome sees once again the solemnity 
of the Capitol. Why then should Tyre and Byblos, Damascus and Baghdad 
remain slaves?” The “direct heirs of these civilizations,” he concluded, only 
asked to create “in this antique land, witness to their ancestors’ glories, a new 
life and civilization.”49 Khayrallah operated in such passages in two modes – 
one deeply diachronic, the other synchronic and explicitly comparative. On 
the one hand, he depended upon an ecumenical invocation of the succession 
of civilizations that had blossomed in the Levant – the Babylonians and the 
Seleucids, the Phoenicians, the Umayyads and Abbasids – to press his 
demand for self-determination on the international community. On the 
other, he argued that the latter should take heed of this rhetorical move on 
the basis of recent precedent, appealing to the aesthetic and political 
sensibilities of the European states that had helped first Greece, then Italy 
realize their national ambitions.   
However, even as it came increasingly to be used in the years after the 
First World War to lend support to the idea of a Lebanese polity founded 
upon ancient antecedents, the Phoenician past did not lose its unsettling, 
ambivalent association with diaspora. This uncertainty found its way, for 
instance, into the lines of La Montagne inspirée, the long, eulogistic poem 
published in 1933 by the businessman and intellectual Charles Corm, often 
regarded as one of the most important ideologues of the new Lebanese 
nation-state. Thus, Corm sang the praises of his ancient forebears, whose 
language – “the tongue of the golden age” – was the “genesis of all alphabets,” 
the “figurehead” which had coursed through the waves to the “horizons of 
the ancient universe,” filling “with pride the sails … of the Phoenician.” 
Moreover, he drew an explicit parallel between these ancient travels and the 
movements of his contemporaries, “who continue this beaming expansion/ 
through which our ancestors, moving from one Cyclades to another, 
searched the continents,” laying claim before the “entire universe” to “our 
place in the sun.” Beneath the entirely conventional evocation of the 
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Phoenicians as the progenitors of the written script and the inventors of the 
sail – tropes of equal importance to Corm, who juggled his poetic passion 
with another, more lucrative, life as the Middle Eastern agent of Ford motors 
– lay a diasporic justification for the Lebanese nation-state: the achievements 
of its constituents scattered through the lands of migration, Corm intimated, 
served to justify its existence and spread its reputation, lifting high the name 
of Lebanon before the nations. But Corm could not wholeheartedly embrace 
migration, which threatened to leave such gaping holes in the fragile fabric of 
Lebanese society. He anxiously urged his compatriots, those keepers of the 
ancestral blood, not to “lose it under a foreign sky,” but to “return and rest 
after your hard battles, beneath the flowers of our orange trees,” to “come 
and live and die in your old ramparts,/ come back to us, a hundred times 
welcome,/” rather than die abroad like “unknown soldiers,” whose services to 
the nation were destined to remain anonymous.50 In such passages, Corm 
hovered uncertainly between two visions of the nation: one encompassing 
migrants, wherever they might be, as integral members of a body politic 
unbound by territorial confines, a polity whose reach was global even as its 
attachments remained profoundly local; and another of the nation-state as an 
intimate, bucolic space, defined by its gentle flora and its rugged 
mountainous escarpments, which had served to protect the Lebanese from 
the depredations of invaders for so long. For all his lyricism, Corm could not 
altogether resolve these ambiguities.  
 
CONCLUSION 
To speak of an ideological construct labeled “Phoenicianism,” I have 
suggested, is to impose confines upon historical inquiry. There was no single 
use for the Phoenician past, and it was not the preserve of Lebanese 
nationalists who eagerly strove to trace the genealogy of their darling state 
into the distant past, and to imbue its novel structures with the sheen of 
ancient glory. For even as its more unsavory aspects were conveniently 
lobbed off, and its tropes – the alphabet and the sail, travel and trade – came 
to be fixed, taking on a rote quality as they were repeated by successive 
literati, the Phoenician past retained a flexible, pliable quality. It came to be 
used in a variety of ways and contexts. But perhaps the most salient of these 
in the years before 1914 was that of migration from the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Looking to find an explanation for these vast displacements, 
and to craft a vision of society and polity that might accommodate these 
movements, the region’s literati resorted to a number of strategies, one of 
which was recourse to the ancient past: the traveled ways and trading 
disposition of the Phoenicians, they argued, might account for the peripatetic 
tendencies and mercantile bent of their contemporaries. This was history not 
as the delimitation of national borders, the definition of a people through a 
fixed chain of descent, but as a diasporic pursuit, a narrative centered upon 
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movement. Only in the years after the First World War did the Phoenician 
past come to be pressed into the service of nationalist claims, and to be used 
as a standard to buttress demands for self-determination. But even as it came 
to be deployed as a justification for political projects and a source of patriotic 
pride, it could not altogether shed its earlier diasporic associations, and the 
ambivalence that came with them. 
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